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Abstract
I analyze the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of control
over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock market
is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights are
controlled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms
listed in Germany’s official markets. About two thirds of this amount is controlled by banks,
industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies. I show that due to current legislation it is
clear for neither group who ultimate exerts control over the shareholding firm itself. For the
remaining blockholders, only blocks controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced
back to the highest level of ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all
reported blocks. The German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is
responsible for the consequences of decisions.
The top five banks and the top three insurance companies are closely related through direct
ownership and voting control. Jointly, these eight firms report control over 14% of all listed
firms, or a market value of DM 147 billion considering only reported voting blocks. I show
that this figure substantially underestimates the true value under control of these blockholders.
The reason is that large ownership links exist between the large shareholders that do not
trigger legal reporting requirements. Therefore, joint majority control by business groups and
their incentives to act in the interests of all shareholders cannot be inferred from published
data.
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Who controls Germany? An exploratory analysis
It is widely known that German corporations are characterized by highly concentrated
ownership and that banks and other financial institutions play an important role. Large
shareholders dominate most listed corporations and financial institutions exert control via
direct ownership, personnel interlockings, and proxy votes.1 Detailed knowledge of how
German corporations are controlled is essential to evaluate the German system of corporate
governance, which has recently attracted great academic and  political interest. Put differently,
the identity of controlling parties must be known before their incentives to actively monitor
corporations can be assessed. Despite the importance of these issues, in-depth empirical
descriptions of corporate governance in Germany are rare.2 To fill this gap, this paper uses the
first-ever complete cross-sectional data set of blockholdings of voting rights in German
corporations, prompted by new regulation in 1995. It provides a detailed account of how
blockholdings in firms listed in the official markets are distributed, what type of economic
entity controls them. Additionally, I examine the identity and power of Germany’s largest
shareholders. To estimate control, I measure both the size of directly held stakes and of
ultimate voting control, and provide statistics on the percentage of all firms controlled by
large blockholders in terms of voting rights and size-weighted measures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The legal background and some
institutional details are briefly discussed in section 1. In section 2 I describe the data used to
analyze voting power. Section 3.1 is devoted to the results from the perspective of listed
corporations. It describes the size and distribution of shareholdings across firms. Section 3.2
presents the results from the perspective of individual shareholders. It describes the
distribution of control across shareholders, analyzes the  power of different shareholder types,
and computes the relative power over listed firms for each type. In section 3.3, I analyze the
economic importance and identity of Germany’s most powerful shareholders. Section 4
discusses the consequences of large voting blocks for shareholder wealth. The final section
concludes.
                                               
1 See Edwards and Fischer (1994) for a comprehensive analysis of financial institutions' involvement in the corporate sector.
2 See Boehmer (1998b) for a critical discussion of empirical studies on German corporate governance.2
1. The German transposition of the EU Transparency Directive3
The European Union’s Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC) was transposed into German
law as part of a securities trading code (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG, BGBL 30. 7. 1994,
I S. 1749ff) that contains a series of measures intended to strengthen Germany’s financial
markets.4 The sections based on the EU Transparency Directive became effective on  January
1, 1995. The WpHG also provides the legal basis for creating a securities trading commission
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe). The BAWe formally addresses
regulations and penalties relating to insider trading, the real-time publication of price-relevant
information (ad-hoc Publizität), and the rules for operating securities houses.
1.1 The filing process for voting blocks
The mechanics of the notification process are simple and closely follow the Transparency
Directive. The main features of the transposition and the Directive are: the filings are made
and published on paper, the shareholder notifies the company of a block and the company
notifies (and pays for notifying) the market. This process may take up to 16 days.
1.2 Who has to report voting stakes?
§ 21 WpHG (notifications of direct shareholdings), § 22 (notifications of shares “attributed”
to a shareholder because he or she controls the way the shares are voted) and § 41 (first time
notification since the law came into force) are the legal “triggers” for the notification process.
• § 21 states that someone crossing 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% or 75% (through purchase, sale or
other means) of the votes of a German company listed on an official EU market has to
notify according to the mechanisms described above. The requirement does not depend on
the share of voting capital controlled but the fraction of the total votes controlled. Voting
caps (Höchststimmrechte) are not taken into account when computing the percentages
(Nottmeier and Schäfer 1997, page 91).
• § 22 is the most complicated piece of the legislation and sets out the rules for “multi-layer”
control of voting shares. It defines which indirectly controlled votes are “attributed” to a
                                               
3 See Becht and Boehmer (1997) and Boehmer (1998c) for a comprehensive review of the legal aspects relating to the
disclosure by German companies.
4 The complete title of the law is “Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel und zur Änderung börsenrechtlicher und
wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften” and is part of the second law to promote the German financial markets (“Zweites3
shareholder. Becht and Boehmer (1997) show that the current version of §22 is inadequate
for providing real transparency on who exerts considerable voting power in German listed
companies.
• § 41 is the first-time notification rule that provides the starting stock from which, through
tracing changes, future “snapshots” of the ownership structure of the voting stock can be
constructed. It states that, unless a notification according to § 21 has already been made
before the first general meeting in 1995, shareholders have to report holdings above 5%.
The provisions of § 22 also apply to first-time notifications.
1.3 Transparency and the WpHG
Although the provisions of these articles appear rather straightforward, a number of
complications arise. Since the provisions of the WpHG leave much room for interpretation, it
is not clear for corporations and the BAWe how to comply. Since there are few court rulings
to date, the BAWe treats the annotations to the WpHG by Schneider (1995) as binding.
Practical issues that arise from the day-to-day implementation of the WpHG are discussed in
Nottmeier and Schäfer (1997). The authors are responsible for the implementation of the
German transposition of the Transparency Directive at the BAWe.5 Becht and Boehmer
(1997) and Boehmer (1998a) discuss several shortcomings of the implementation and the
main findings are summarized below.
1.3.1 Banks’ proxy votes are not reported
The German government, in its own annotations to the WpHG, decided that banks have not to
report proxy votes (the well known and much discussed Auftragsstimmrecht mechanism).6
This opinion is in agreement with Schneider (1995) and is justified by the fact that §135(5)
and §128(2) AktG force banks to consult shareholders, make a voting proposal and, unless the
shareholder instructs them otherwise, are afterwards bound by their proposal
(Bundestagsdrucksache 12/6679, page 54). Since the banks must stick with their original
proposal, it is argued that the votes should not be attributed to the banks because legally it is
not under their discretion to decide how the shares are voted. Although there are no precise
                                               
5 Although their contribution is not legally binding and the authors stress that it reflects their personal views and not those of
the BAWe, it is an account of the de facto interpretation and implementation of the WpHG text, legal guidelines issued by the
government with the law, and the interaction between the provisions of the WpHG and other legal texts and opinions.
6 The intentions of the law (Gesetzesbegründung) were published in Bundestagsdrucksache 12/6679.4
figures on how many bank customers actually take advantage of the possibility to instruct
their bank, it is alleged that very few customers do. In practice, there is little difference
between “free to propose how to vote and not be challenged” and “free to vote.”
Baums and Fraune (1995) show that proxy votes give banks majority control over many
corporate annual general shareholder meetings (AGMs), including their own for the top five
banks. They also document that banks virtually never vote against management proposals.
Thus, proxy votes represent substantial control over listed firms. If the spirit of the
Transparency Directive were to be applied rigorously, a notification should be required before
the AGM and the banks would have to report the shares for which they have received no
explicit voting instructions. Alternatively, they could be forced to declare on whose behalf
they vote the shares.
1.3.2 Votes of investment companies are not attributed to any party
While limited reporting requirements apply to Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (investment fund
management companies), they neither affect their owners nor the holders of investment
certificates.7 One would expect that the funds invested by investment companies are either
controlled by the owners of the investment company or the investors who deposited the funds
with the company. In practice the voting stock is attributed to neither group. § 10 Ia explicitly
exempts votes owned by KAGs from the requirements of § 22 WpHG. Controlling owners of
the investment companies (mostly financial institutions) do not have to notify because it is
alleged that the managers of the investment fund act in the best interest of their clients.
Holders of certificates do not have to notify because they cannot exert control themselves.
Hence, in practice Kapitalanlagegesellschaften play the role of making controlling ownership
anonymous. Moreover, it seems plausible that the owner can induce the KAG to make a short-
term investment in a large stake of a listed firm that is currently in a takeover contest. The
stake would not have to be reported if distributed over several KAGs owned by the same
bank, but could potentially become pivotal in the contest. Neither would the stakes
substantially affect fund performance if held for a sufficiently short period of time. Since such
                                               
7 German funds are required to keep their equity capital and that provided by fund investors separate. Therefore owners and
fund investors are not the same party. In practice most funds are owned by financial institutions. In regard to the reporting of
voting control over listed firms, § 10 Ia 3 KAGG specifies the limitation to § 21 WpHG that voting control less than 10%
deriving from a fund controlled by the KAG does not have to be reported. This contrasts to the general 5% minimum for
other entities.5
maneuvers would clearly affect the fate of the target company, they should be disclosed
without restrictions for full transparency.
1.3.3 Votes are not always attributed to their de facto owners
When the shareholder of the listed company is not an individual but a company, a voting trust,
a family pool, etc., votes controlled by this entity should be attributed to its owners for full
transparency. The interpretation of the relevant §21 and §22 allows for too many exceptions
and very often the notification requirement does not extend beyond the shareholder company.
For example, Nottmeier and Schäfer (1997, page 93) argue that shares held by non-listed
firms only have to be attributed to their owner if the owner has majority control over firm.
This judgement is based on WpHG §22(3) where “control” is clearly defined and therefore
Nottmeier and Schäfer argue that other definitions of “control” found in German or European
law are not applicable. This limitation opens the opportunity to hide controlling stakes by
dispersing votes over a number of small intermediate holding companies. For example, shares
held by unlisted firms with two 50%-owners are never attributed beyond the level of the
unlisted firm, because none of the owners is deemed to be “controlling“ in these cases. Thus,
if two individuals control 100% of a listed corporation via two unlisted holding companies, of
which each individual owns 50%, they jointly have full control over the listed firm, but do not
have to notify it.
1.3.4 Dormant voting rights are not reported
As recommended by Schneider (1995), the official annotation to the WpHG, only the control
of voting rights, as opposed to cash-flow rights, is reported to the BAWe. Therefore, dormant
voting rights such as those associated with preference shares (Vorzugsaktien) do not have to
be reported, even though it is legally mandated that preference share obtain regular voting
rights once the preferential dividend is not paid in two consecutive years.
1.3.5 Summary
In sum, the German WpHG does not provide full transparency of control because several
control rights are not reported. Additionally, the concentration of voting control will be
understated because not all cross-ownership links are publicly known. For example, family
pools are only considered an entity if a formal and explicit voting contract exists. Thus, when
interpreting the figures below it is important to realize that they only provide a lower bound
on both stake size and the concentration of control. Given the substantial concentration6
documented below despite these limitations, however, this bias is favorable in that it tends to
make the results stronger.
2. Data and sample construction
2.1 Sample
The analysis is based on data from BAWe (1996), the first-ever official cross-sectional
“snapshot” of the distribution of voting blocks in Germany on September 30, 1996. It contains
the cumulative result of all notifications up to this date according to §§ 21, 22, and 41 WpHG
since 1 January 1995. By year-end 1996, 436 firms trade in the official market segments in
Germany. All of these firms should have declared any blockholders controlling 5% or more
by early 1996. The BAWe (1996) report, however, includes only 402 German companies.
Therefore, 34 companies or 7.6% of all officially listed firms had not received any
notifications or had failed to report them since the WpHG came into force. To obtain a more
complete data set, I investigate the missing firms.
First, Deutsche Telekom went public in October 1996 and was not traded in September. An
additional 17 firms were included in later versions of the BAWe report, even though their
filings had in several cases been made before September 1996. For an additional 11 firms, I
find ownership information in Hoppenstedt’s Konzernstruktur-Datenbank (KSD).8 For six
firms (Bremer Vulkan, Georg, Arn., Marschollek Lautenschl. und Partner AG, Terrex
Handels-AG, Traub AG, and Würzburger Hofbräu AG I was not able to find any reliable
information and excluded them from the analysis below. The final sample includes 430 firms
and consists of the original 402 from BAWe (1996), 17 from BAWe (1997), and 11 from
KSD. For all firms I cross-checked KSD and BAWe data to eliminate errors and to confirm
reported figures. I also discarded all stakes below 5% that are included in BAWe (1996) but
not attributed to some other controlling party. These filings are not required by law and are
most likely erroneous notifications.
The BAWe has taken the data from the WpHG notifications and tabulated them. While it
would enhance transparency, the breakdown of the “attribution reason” is not published.
                                               
8 KSD contains mostly ownership information, but not always voting information as used in this analysis. The eleven firms I
found on KSD are the following: Amira Verwaltungs AG, Commerzbank AG, Custodia Holding, Garant Schuh AG, IWKA
Industrie-Werke Karlsruhe Augsburg AG, Leica Camera, Mannesmann AG, Merck, MLF Holding AG, Quante AG, Westag
& Getalit AG. Out of those, Amira, Custodia, Leica, Merck, Quante, and Westag have substantial blockholdings (greater than
5%) that were not reported to the BAWe by May 1998.7
Instead, the BAWe publishes the aggregate of direct and attributed shares representing the
total percentage of shares the notifying company controls. In addition, it reports the fraction
of total votes that are indirectly controlled and hence attributed to the shareholder. From these
figures, I calculate voting blocks in the reporting listed firm following Becht and Boehmer
(1997). Since the direct and attributed shares cannot simply be summed up to avoid double
counting, I trace all direct stakes to their ultimate reporting owner to manually determine total
block ownership. This process requires knowledge of the ownership and control relations
between the reporting shareholders and is based on various editions of KSD, Hoppenstedt‘s
Handbuch der Aktiengesellschaften, and Wer gehört zu wem?, a triennial publication by
Commerzbank.
The difficulty of appropriately assigning voting blocks is best illustrated using an example.
Suppose that shareholder A owns 10% directly and 5% indirectly, and shareholder B owns
5% directly. Then the following information can be inferred from the BAWe publication:
Shareholder Direct holdings Attributed holdings
A 10% 5%
B 5%
It is not immediately obvious whether 10% or 15% of the investigated firm are held by
reporting shareholders. If B is controlled by A, then the only voting block of 15% would be
assigned to A and represents the total fraction of votes controlled by large shareholders. If A
and B are unrelated, one voting block of 15% would be assigned to A, and another one of 5%
to B, and a total of 20% is controlled by large shareholders.9 Thus, the relation between B and
A determines the number of voting blocks that are assigned in the process and the inferred
concentration of control. This example also illustrates the substantial information content that
is lost in the BAWe publications by not reporting the attribution reason (which, in the first
example, could state that the 5% attributed to A are directly held by its subsidiary B).10
                                               
9 Such a situation could arise, for example, if the votes controlled indirectly by A belong to shareholders that individually fall
below the reporting threshold of 5%.
10 Such difficulties also occur in the sample. For example, the sum of voting blocks of Jute-Spinnerei und Weberei Bremen is
100.03% if we use the standard procedure. K. H. Rehkopf controls 50.134% without holding a direct stake and the BAWe
report further shows two direct stakes of 49.9% and 50.084%. Thus, if the filings are correct, it must be the case that Rehkopf
controls part of both direct stakes. Unfortunately, this information cannot be inferred from the BAWe data. The resulting
error is, however, very small and we assign one block of 50.134% and one of 49.866%.8
2.2 Descriptive statistics for size measures
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the size variables used to weight voting power in the
following analysis. Each cell reports the mean, the median, and the number of nonmissing
observations. I use four different measures to approximate size and discuss their shortcomings
below. These variables are generally measured at year-end 1995. In the few cases that had no
information at that time, they are measured in 1996.
Sales refer to total sales during the fiscal year. The biggest drawback is the limited
comparability across industrial firm, banks, and insurance companies. Due to their important
role in the German economy neither industry should be excluded from the analysis. Following
the definitions in § 23 GWB, I use one tenth of total assets for banks and net premium receipts
for insurance companies to make sales figures usable for comparisons across these industries.
Therefore, comparisons based on sales are easiest to interpret within the three groups, but not
across.
Cash flow refers to after-tax profit plus depreciation during the fiscal year. This definition
leads to the fewest exclusions because both items are available for almost all firms.
Subtracting interest and taxes would lead to substantial reductions in the sample size.
Employees are the number of employees reported in the annual report.
Market values are calculated on the basis of outstanding equity by the end of December 1995.
The sample firms have up to three classes of shares outstanding (ordinary shares, preference
shares without voting rights, and registered shares with or without transfer restrictions and
other special rights). All firms have at least one class listed in the official Frankfurt market,
triggering mandatory reporting to the BAWe. To calculate the value of nontraded shares, I
make the following assumptions: (1) ordinary shares trade at a premium of 20% relative to
preference shares, and (2) registered shares trade at the same price as ordinary shares. The
premium of around 20% for voting shares is supported by several studies and own
calculations. The second assumption cannot be supported empirically, because registered
shares and another class are rarely listed simultaneously for the same firm. The individual
market values of traded shares are reported in the columns MV1 traded up to MV3 traded. MV
traded refers to the sum across all traded classes of shares, and MV total is the sum over all
classes under the two assumptions above.
The sample firms without missing observations together have DM 1743 billion in sales, DM
134 billion cash flow, 3.9 million employees, and a total market value of DM 1025 billion.9
Table 1 further disaggregates the sample into banks, insurance companies, and industrial
firms, and also shows the size measures for stratifications according to their medians.
Comparing the sales figures across these groups may partially reveal their different
definitions: bank ‚sales‘ substantially exceed the average, while the corresponding figure for
insurance firms is substantially below the mean. Cash flow and employee figures are closer
together, except for insurance companies. Since all three variables depend strongly on
reporting practices and especially on the degree of consolidation of annual reports, it seems
that the available data significantly understate the size of insurance companies. Consequently,
all stakes held in these firms will be understated when weighted by one of these three
variables. Fortunately, using market values overcomes this bias. The last column shows that
the average market value of equity across all sample firms is DM 2.4 billion, that of banks is
DM 4.2 billion, and that of insurance companies is DM 6.3 billion. Furthermore, the
difference between traded and total market value is small, so that the assumptions used to
compute the total are of little practical relevance. Given the discussion above, I will give
interpretations of results based on market values the greatest weight in the analysis below, but
continue to show other size measures for comparison.
3. The concentration of voting control
The objective for this and the following section is to describe the concentration of voting
control over listed firms in Germany. To this end, I use two approaches. First, concentration is
measured across firms. This approach ignores the identity of shareholders in that the results
do not depend on the number of shareholders. Put alternatively, whether all blocks are held by
the same entity or each block has a different owner does not affect the estimated distribution
of ownership across firms. Second, concentration is measured across shareholders. This
approach is independent of the number of (target) firms, but takes into account the identity of
shareholders. Both approaches have their own merits: the former is relevant from an
investment perspective, while the second one is better suited to answer governance-related
questions. In this paper, the primary focus is on the latter approach.
3.1 Voting control from the firms’ perspective
All results in this section are based on aggregation across the 430 sample companies. For all
430 firms, 707 different shareholders control 907 stakes directly, and 514 different entities
control 755 voting blocks in these companies. This corresponds to an average of 2.1 notified
direct stakes and 1.8 notified voting blocks per company. Table 2 presents the empirical10
distribution of the number of stakes and voting blocks per firm. Seven firms have no
shareholder controlling more than 5% of voting rights. About 48% of the sample firms (206)
have only one major (direct) shareholder and 58% (249) have only one (voting) blockholder.
More than 5 direct stakes and more than 4 voting blocks per firm are rare, each accounting for
only 4% and 3%, respectively, of the sample firms. Additionally (not shown in the table), the
median size of the largest stake is more than three times that of the second largest, and the
median size of the largest voting block is more than four times that of the second largest.
Thus, most firms are controlled by a dominant shareholder and not by a coalition of several
parties.
3.1.1 The magnitude of direct stakes and voting blocks in percentages
Table 3 shows the distribution of the size of direct stakes and voting blocks across firms. It
reports summary statistics on the aggregate blockholdings, the smallest, largest, median, and
mean stake for each firm, and additionally on the interquartile range, standard deviation, and
concentration of stakes per firm. For example, the upper left cell shows that on average
69.88% of each firm’s voting rights are held by large shareholders. The average of mean
direct stakes is 47.6% and the mean voting block is 53.0%. In half the firms the smallest
direct stake exceeds 25.0%, while the largest stake exceeds 54.0%. In 75% of the firms, the
largest stake exceeds 26.0%. The smallest voting block exceeds 45.9% in half the firms and
the largest voting block is beyond 29.6% in three quarters of all firms.
The last two columns report concentration measures for the largest holding and all holdings
per firm. The first measure is computed as the largest holding squared, the latter is the sum of
all squared holdings (assuming stakes that are not reported are sufficiently close to zero). Both
for direct stakes and voting blocks the difference between the two columns is relatively small.
Since smaller shareholders add little concentration, this implies that control over the typical
firm is dominated by just one shareholder. In sum, these results confirm the general view that
control is highly concentrated in Germany.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the frequency of direct stakes and voting blocks, respectively. An
interesting observation emerges with respect to both, because stakes and blocks are clustered
at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% of the votes. These “steps” correspond to the blocking minority
(that can be used to block  statute changes), a simple majority and a supermajority. Since the
supermajority can be set higher than 75% in the company statute, voting blocks of less than
25% could also represent a blocking majority. The fourth peak at 95% corresponds to the11
minimum percentage for complete control over a firm, including buying out the remaining 5%
of shareholders at below-market consideration. The figures suggest that block sizes are
carefully and deliberately chosen and that control, as opposed to financial participation, is an
important issue for stakeholders.
3.1.2 Differences in control over industrial firms and financial institutions
The previous section has focused on the distribution of individual stakes within and across
firms. In this section, I analyze the distribution across industries and size groups to investigate
potential differences in concentration across these groups. Table 4 presents the mean, median,
minimum, and maximum of the sum of stakes, the largest stake, and the number of stakes per
firm. For example, the upper left cell reports the means of these variables related to direct
stakes for the whole sample. It implies that the average percentage of voting shares controlled
by large (i. e., reporting) shareholders is 69.88%. Out of this total, the largest stake averages
55.28%, and the average firm has 2.11 large (direct) shareholders. The second column reports
the corresponding medians, which are close to the means. The third and fourth columns report
the minimum and maximum, respectively. The remaining four columns contain the
corresponding statistics on voting blocks. This analysis reveals few differences between the
control structure of banks, insurance firms, and the full sample. I do find that large firms have
somewhat smaller stakes held by large shareholders, but on average the sum of voting blocks
is still above 68% and the largest voting block above 55%.
3.2 Voting control from the shareholders’ perspective
All results in this paragraph are based on aggregation across the 707 direct stakeholders and
514 blockholders, respectively, who control voting rights in excess of 5%. Table 5 shows that
88.7% of all direct shareholders and 85.0% of all blockholders control just a single stake. The
remaining parties control up to 24 direct stakes and up to 25 voting blocks. This distribution
indicates that a few investors may have substantial impact on several firms. To measure  the
importance of their influence, I use three different approaches. First, I calculate aggregate
control based only on percentage holdings. Second, I weight all stakes and voting blocks by
the size measures discussed above. I present averages, totals, and the total as a percentage of
all listed firms to put these figures into perspective. Third, I measure the relative power of
each shareholder by examining the rank of his stake relative to other shareholders in the same
firm, and by calculating the average control concentration of the firms he is controlling. For
each approach, I consider differences across industrial firms, banks, and insurance companies.12
3.2.1 The magnitude of direct stakes and voting blocks in percentages
Table 6 shows the percentage of all shares controlled by large shareholders. The first row
indicates that 835 different entities have filed holdings with the BAWe. The 907 reported
direct stakes correspond to 69.88% of all shares issued by the 430 sample firms and the 755
reported voting blocks control 70.16% of all shares. The remaining rows present the
corresponding figures for different shareholder types. Banks hold 109 direct stakes and 116
voting blocks in the sample firms, corresponding to 7.14% and 7.82% of outstanding equity.
The last two columns reveal that the average direct stake held by banks is 28.16% and that the
average voting block is 28.98%. The largest fraction of listed firms is controlled by industrial
firms (26%), followed by individuals (13%), banks (8%), holdings (7%), insurance companies
(5%), and investment firms (4%). Two foreign nations (Iran and Kuwait) hold stakes in
German firms.
Table 7 presents the same analysis for 374 industrial firms. The major blockholders are
industrial firms (30%), individuals (15%), holdings (8%), and banks (5%). Table 8 shows that
the 30 listed banks are primarily controlled by other banks (50%), the government (6%), and
insurance firms (5%). Finally, listed insurance companies (Table 9) are controlled by other
insurance companies (44%), banks (11% including bank-controlled investment firms),
industrial firms (11%), and other investment firms (6%).
3.2.2 The relative power of different shareholder types
To uncover potentially different motives in holding and controlling equity interests, I first sort
the percentage stakes in each sample firm by magnitude and compute their rank. Next, I
calculate for each shareholder the average rank of his investment and the number of total
reported stakes in his target. Analogously, I calculate a Herfindahl index by summing the
squared stakes (blocks) for each firm, and compute the average for each shareholder.
Table 13 contains the results for direct stakes and voting blocks. For example, 514
shareholders own voting blocks with an average rank of 1.82 out of 2.7 blocks. The average
concentration of the target firms‘ ownership is 0.36 (median 0.30). Concentration measures
based on direct stakes yield an estimate that tends to show less than the true concentration,
because several direct shareholders may be controlled by the same parent. Nevertheless, for
the different shareholder types direct stakes and voting blocks yield similar results and I will
concentrate the following discussion on voting blocks. Several observations emerge from
Table 13. First, blocks controlled by industrial firms have a high rank (the average is 1.34) in13
listed firms with highly concentrated ownership (the average Herfindahl index is 0.54). Banks
and insurance companies typically command blocks of relatively low rank (1.95 and 2.07,
respectively) in firms with average concentration (0.35 and 0.38, respectively). In contrast,
individuals control low-ranked stakes (2.33) in firms with a low concentration (0.24) and the
largest number of blocks (3.5). Comparing these findings with Table 6 reveals one source of
these differences. While industrial firms command blocks that average 61%, the average size
for the remaining groups is much smaller (banks: 29%, insurance firms: 28%, individuals:
27%). Thus, the high concentration of the targets of industrial firms seems to be caused
primarily by the size of their own stakes, implying that they are typically in control of their
targets. Individuals typically have sizable blocks as well, but are dominated by another
blockholder. Finally, banks and insurance firms typically hold the second place as well, but
are nominally less important because of the higher concentration in their targets.
3.2.3 The magnitude of size-weighted direct stakes and voting blocks
So far, my analysis has focussed on the size of percentage blocks without regard to the
attached economic value. In this section, I weight blocks by various size measures to assess
the concentration in terms of value. I first analyze means and medians of size-weighted stakes
before looking at totals, both as a percentage of listed firms and in absolute terms. Table 10
presents means and medians of size-weighted stakes. The first four columns show direct
stakes weighted by sales, cash flow, employees, and market value, respectively, and the
remaining four columns show the corresponding figures for voting blocks. Each cell contain
the mean, median, and number of different shareholders (the denominator in the means
calculations). For the whole sample, notifying shareholders on average control a market value
of DM 950 million, out of which DM 681 million are due to directly held stakes. In terms of
the other size measures, blockholders on average control DM 1437 million in sales, DM 120
million in cash flow, and 3923 employees. The remaining rows present the corresponding
figures for different types of shareholders. On average, the German government, foreign
governments, banks, and insurance firms control the largest amount of market value. The
other size measures show about the same ranking of shareholder types.
Table 11 provides information similar to that in Table 6, except that stakes are now weighted
by the size of the target firm. While all blockholders jointly control 71% of listed equity
(Table 6), their voting rights govern only 42% of aggregate sales of listed firms, 46% of their
cash flow, 46% of their employees, and 47% of their market value. Thus, for the voting
blocks of all reporting shareholders, the controlled share of aggregate size is substantially14
lower than the controlled share of aggregate voting rights. The subsequent rows of Table 11
reveal that his is mainly due to industrial firms, holding/investment firms, individuals, and
foundations. The reverse is true, however, for banks, the governments, and especially
insurance companies. The latter control only 4.6% of all listed shares, but 7.9% of all listed
market value. These results suggest that banks, governments, and insurance companies
command few, but relatively high-valued voting blocks.
To corroborate this observation, I calculate the aggregate market value controlled by the
various shareholder types. Each cell of Table 12 contains the aggregate market value
controlled via direct stakes (upper value) and that controlled via voting blocks (lower value),
as well as the respective numbers of shareholders (blockholders) in parentheses. The last
column shows that banks, the government, and insurance companies command 47 + 21 + 30 =
98 voting blocks, controlling DM 247 billion. In contrast, industrial companies and
individuals own 135 + 184 = 319 voting blocks, but control only DM 142 billion in market
value. Therefore, holdings of banks, the government, and insurance firms are more
concentrated and more strategically placed in that they command the assets having the largest
value. This observation holds for all types of listed companies, although to a lesser extent for
listed industrial firms and a higher extent for listed banks and insurance companies.
3.2.4 Implications for the effectiveness of current disclosure legislation
As discussed earlier, Becht and Boehmer (1997) show that current reporting practice does not
provide full transparency of control. Among the reasons are substantially limited reporting
requirements for banks and investment funds, and the failure of the WpHG to generally
require attribution of control to individuals controlling less than the majority of votes in
holding/investment firms. I show above that holding companies, investment firms, and
foundations control about 13% of listed equity. Their owners remain anonymous, since
attribution stops at that level. Even in the hypothetical case that each of these holding firms is
owned equally by the same three individuals or firms, each holding less than 50%, this
substantial degree of control would not trigger mandatory reporting to the BAWe. The same
argument holds additionally for all industrial firms, banks, and insurance companies that
control voting blocks and are not listed in the official market: the BAWe filings do not reveal
who exerts ultimate control over these large blockholders.
Moreover, the cross-ownership between shareholders reporting to the BAWe is generally not
revealed, and neither is ownership of the listed sample firms in the reporting shareholders,15
control due to proxy voting by banks and investment firms. Given the highly concentrated
ownership structure in Germany, this appears to be an tremendous obstacle to transparency.
On the one hand, the data presented above should be viewed as a lower bound to the
concentration of control and to the control attributed to the various shareholder types. On the
other hand, the already enormous market value controlled by entities whose ultimate
controlling owner is not known shows the limitations of the existing transparency legislation.
3.3 The economic importance and identity of the largest shareholders in
Germany
The previous sections have concentrated on cross-sectional differences between shareholder
types. In the following section I provide descriptive statistics on the overall top ten
shareholders and subsequently analyze the top five of each major shareholder category. In
each case, shareholders are ranked by the market value all voting blocks they reported to the
BAWe. Each table reports the market value of stakes held directly and that of controlled
voting blocks. The last column reports the value of controlled blocks as a percentage of the
aggregate market value of all 430 sample firms. In addition, each table lists the major voting-
block targets (in excess of DM 300 million), sorted by decreasing market value of the block,
and the major blockholders of the controlling firm itself.
3.3.1 The top ten shareholders overall
For the ten largest shareholders, Table 14 illustrates the economic power in absolute and
percentage terms. Rank 1 is held by a government agency through its control over Deutsche
Telekom. Since this stake is transitory and will be sold over time as the privatization
proceeds, it is more interesting to examine the next largest shareholders. Ranks 2 and 4 are
held by insurance firms (Allianz and Münchner Rück) and ranks 3, 5, and 6 are held by banks
(Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Bayerische Vereinsbank). An individual is on rank 7,
and ranks 8, 9 and 10 are held by industrial firms (RWE, VIAG, Kuwait Petroleum). Jointly
these ten blockholders control voting blocks worth DM 227 billion, corresponding to 22% of
listed market value.
In fact, the actual market value under control of the top ten is much larger: even though the
individual stakes are typically minority blocks, a business group as a whole may have
majority control. I illustrate this argument using the top five private shareholders (ranks two
through six), who alone control 13% of aggregate market value. Comparing this figure to the
46% controlled by all reporting blockholders jointly indicates their economic importance and16
shows how top-heavy the size-weighted distribution of control is. The blockholder column
shows that these five firms are interconnected via substantial ownership interests. Table 15
reports the major ownership (as opposed to voting) interests among the five. Allianz,
Münchner Rück, and Dresdner Bank are majority-controlled by the circle of top five
shareholders. Deutsche Bank and Bayerische Vereinsbank are widely held except for stakes of
6.53% and 10.61%, respectively, held by the top five. These two, in turn, control sizeable
stakes in the remaining three. The presented figures still substantially underestimate true
interconnections since proxy votes are not considered in the table. In addition, several
additional cross-holdings exist that involve lower-tier holding companies jointly owned by
some of the top five. These holding companies frequently hold stakes in other related firms,
which in turn may control voting rights in the top five. These additional control rights are not
included in Table 15. Finally, the top shareholders frequently share stakes in the same target
firms, which also tends to understate the mutual control exerted by the top five in each other.
Therefore, the value controlled by the top five is much larger than indicated in Table 14. The
reason is that due to interconnections between the five they jointly have majority control over
several firms as shown for Allianz, Münchner Rück, and Dresdner Bank in Table 15. To
calculate the true value controlled, the value of dispersed shares in these firms could be added
to the value of the actual blocks, which would almost double the 13% estimated above (this is
correct if a majority stake effectively confers full control to the blockholder).
It is difficult to conduct this estimation rigorously for all firms, because the links between
shareholders are generally not known. In the example above, the top five have no single
majority stake in each other. Therefore, the WpHG does not require that votes controlled by,
say, Allianz, are attributed to Deutsche Bank or another group member. For full transparency,
the votes should be attributed to the top five jointly and be reported in addition to the
individual figures.
3.3.2 The top five banks
The top five banks listed in Table 16 control DM 74 billion or 7.22% of all listed market
value in Germany via reported voting blocks. This share does not include control via proxy
votes or „dormant“ control via shares held for trading purposes. Banks must not vote trading-
book shares but can potentially build up a significant holding without reporting ownership.
Such a block could command a significant control premium if sold to a third party or could be
declared a voting block by reporting it to the BAWe at any point in time. To the extent that17
such a holding becomes pivotal in a takeover contest it could also represent substantial voting
power without the explicit ability to exercise voting rights.
Holdings of the remaining 39 banks are negligible relative to those of the top five. In Table 11
I report that all reporting banks jointly control 8.2% of aggregate market value. Therefore
88% of the aggregate value controlled by banks is concentrated in the top five institutions,
and the remaining 39 share the rest. These five banks are subject to little outside control. First,
they share blockholders and other ownership links as reported in Table 15. Second, Baums
and Fraune (1995) show that at their respective 1992 AGMs, these five banks controlled a
majority of each others voting rights. Therefore, these five companies most likely represent
the single most powerful (informal) voting pool in Germany, even without considering the
additional influence through the affiliated insurance companies.
3.3.3 The top five industrial firms
The five largest industrial shareholders in Table 17 control DM 41 billion or 4% of the market
capitalization. The top two firms control about half of that and are utility companies
controlling stakes in several regional utilities in addition to other holdings. The other three
firms are foreign corporations holding only one voting block.
3.3.4 The top five family or worker pools
The top five voting pools in Table 18 control DM 12 billion or 1.2% of market capitalization.
This group includes reported control rights that derive from formal and explicit arrangements
among a limited number of individuals.
3.3.5 The top five government agencies
The top five governmental shareholders in Table 19 control DM 69 billion or 6.7% of the
market. The classification is somewhat arbitrary, since it is not clear how control is exerted in
practice. For example, the federal government of Germany controls more stakes than reported
in the table. It is not clear, however, to what extent nominally independent government
agencies depend on decisions made at the federal level (implying that all government entities
should be treated as a single shareholder) and to which extent they are able to make
independent decisions.18
3.3.6 The top five holding companies
By construction, all holding companies are firms within a business group that are used to
control voting blocks in listed corporations. Thus, most holdings in Table 20 vote only one
block (with the exception of Metro Holding) and jointly control DM 18 billion or 1.8% of
market capitalization. Owners of the holdings are often unknown, because only officially
listed firms must report their control structure to the BAWe. The ones I could identify from
other sources are listed in the blockholder column.
3.3.7 The top five investment firms
Similar to holding companies, investment firms primarily hold blocks in only one target (the
distinction between the two is somewhat arbitrary). Table 21 shows that the top five jointly
control DM 7 billion or 0.7% of market capitalization.
3.3.8 The top five bank or insurance-controlled investment firms
The subsample of bank or insurance-controlled investment firms is not complete, because
ownership and control information is not available for all investment firms. Thus, only few of
these firms are included in this group. The remaining ones remain classified as holdings or
investment firms, even if controlled by financial institutions. Table 22 presents blocks
controlled by the four largest firms (the remaining firms do not control blocks greater than
DM 300 million and are not shown). The top four control DM 6.1 billion or 0.59% of market
capitalization. This set of firms should be viewed as an example of how financial business
groups structure their voting blocks, but not as the exhaustive set.
3.3.9 The top five individuals
Table 23 shows that the top five individuals control DM 26.1 billion or 2.5% of market
capitalization. It also illustrates that various members of the same family need not report their
joint holdings, even if an informal voting contract existed.
3.3.10 The top five foundations
The foundations listed in Table 24 control DM 6.6 billion or 0.6% of market capitalization. It
also illustrates that some foundations serve as group layers above the main group corporation,
while others serve as holding companies. Since foundations have no owner, it is generally
difficult to identify who controls its decisions and those related to its voting blocks.19
3.3.11 The top five insurance firms
The top five insurance companies in Table 25 control DM 76.2 billion or 7.4% of market
capitalization. German banks control substantial stakes in the top three, while the remaining
two are majority owned by foreign insurance firms.
4. Blockholders and shareholder interests
As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the presence of blockholdings does not
generically imply shareholder wealth maximization. Large blockholders have incentives to
maximize the value of their shares. Whether this involves maximizing firm value depends on
the degree to which they can extract transfers from small shareholders. First, the typical
German business group includes several firms with outside equity and several without. Thus,
it may be rational for large shareholders to transfer resources from subsidiaries with outside
equity to other group units. Second, German law effectively allows sizeable transfers to
blockholders once a coalition owns at least 75% of the votes. Specifically, a 75% majority
may legally make a binding tender offer to minority shareholders below market value.11
Wenger, Hecker, and Knoesel (1996) analyze such offers to minority shareholders and find
that in 39 of 53 cases the offer is below the market value on the day before, and in 32 cases
below the market value three months earlier. For the former 39 cases, the market value on
average exceeds the compensation to minority shareholders by 74%. Additionally,
blockholders may use crossholdings and pyramidal groups to transfer resources from
subsidiaries with outside shareholders to units without.12 Therefore, a priori it is not clear that
it is easier for blockholders to increase the value of their stake by acting on behalf of all
shareholders, an issue clearly deserving future research efforts.
A similar argument holds for voting blocks controlled by the financial sector. Due to their
information advantage, banks are potentially very effective monitors, but will generally have
little incentive to act on behalf of other shareholders. First, due to proxy votes and board
memberships their control rights substantially exceed their interest in equity cash-flow.
Second, for the typical firm, the amount of debt held by banks exceeds the amount of equity
                                               
11 §§ 304, 320b AktG.
12 Several such cases are discussed by Wenger and Kaserer (1996).20
held in the same firm by a factor greater than ten and much likely substantially larger.13
Therefore, such a bank would optimally use its votes to maximize the value of debt and not
that of equity.14 Thus, the effectiveness of banks as actively monitoring shareholder
representatives is ultimately an empirical question and is discussed in the next section.
5. Conclusions
I have analyzed the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of
control over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock
market is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights
are controlled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms
listed in Germany’s official markets. If a large voting block effectively controls a higher
percentage than its nominal stake, this figure may be substantially larger. For example, a 60%
voting block may represent a much higher percentage of voting rights present at the AGM.
About two thirds of the 47% is controlled by banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance
companies. I show that due to current legislation it is clear for neither group who exerts
ultimate control over the shareholding firm itself. For the remaining blockholders, only blocks
controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced back to the highest level of
ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all reported blocks. The
German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is responsible for the
consequences of decisions.
The top five banks and the top three insurance companies are closely related through direct
ownership and voting control. Jointly, these eight firms report control over 14% of all listed
firms, or a market value of DM 147 billion considering only reported voting blocks. I show
that this figure substantially underestimates the true value under control of these blockholders.
                                               
13 No publicly available figures provide information on the precise composition of banks’ interest in equity and debt to
German listed corporations. Economy-wide, Edwards and Fischer (1994) estimate that bank-supplied equity to non-banks is
about 3% of bank-supplied loans to the same firms. Alternatively, a back-of-the-envelope calculation proceeds as follows. In
1996, the DAI reports that the equity-to-capital ratio of listed corporations is 39% (DAI Fact Book 1996). Own calculations
reveal that banks own about 8% of these firms’ equity. Since German firms very rarely use public bonds, it is save to assume
that most long-term debt consists of bank loans. Thus, the portfolio of a typical bank can be described as a function of the
ratio of bank loans to total corporate liabilities. For example, if all corporate debt were from banks, the banks finance
8%*39%=3.12% of listed firms’ total assets in the form of equity shares, and 61% in the form of loans. Using the cautious
assumption that corporate liabilities consist to only one third of bank loans, banks still finance about 20% of the corporations’
total assets using loans. Therefore, for the typical bank the value of its loan portfolio to a typical listed corporation exceeds
the equity interest in the same firm by a factor between 7 and 20.
14 For the U. S., Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) document evidence consistent with the view that banks use their voting
rights in the interest of management (as opposed to that of shareholders) when banks have debt or fee-related income
associated with the firm.21
The reason is that large ownership links exist between the large shareholders that do not
trigger legal reporting requirements. Therefore, joint majority control by business groups
cannot be inferred from published data.
This exploratory study raises intriguing questions for future research and has important
economic and policy implications:
• Current German transparency legislation (WpHG) is not adequate to achieve the objective
of transparency as stated by the European Commission and those stated by the German
Parliament. To this end, this study illustrates the importance of additional reporting
requirements for proxy voting by banks, voting control by investment funds, by firms not
listed in an official market, and by business groups whose members jointly control a
majority in each other. So far, neither needs to be disclosed.
• The potentially adverse effects of insufficient transparency are amplified by the ability of
large blockholders to extract value from smaller shareholders. An investor in a typical
German corporations faces a majority of voting rights controlled by large shareholders. To
the extent that expropriation is possible, he will discount the value of shares to reflect his
weak bargaining position. Full disclosure of control would likely reduce uncertainty with
respect to expropriation. This, in turn, would have the desirable effect of reducing the cost
of capital for German corporations and therefore their market value. To determine the
cross-sectional value of transparency is an important question for future empirical
research.22
6. References
Adams, M., 1994, Die Usurpation von Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels Ringverflechtung in der
Die Aktiengesellschaft 39, 148-158.
Baums, T. and C. Fraune, 1995, Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft: Eine
empirische Untersuchung, Die Aktiengesellschaft 40, 97-112.
BAWe, 1996, Bedeutende Stimmrechtsanteile an amtlich notierten Aktiengesellschaften zum
30. September 1996, Frankfurt a. M. (and other annual issues).
Becht, M. and E. Boehmer, 1997, Transparency of ownership and control in Germany,
Working paper, Humboldt-University Berlin.
Boehmer, E., 1998a, Corporate governance, ownership, and transparency in Germany,
Working paper, Humboldt-University Berlin.
Boehmer, 1998b, Ownership and performance in Germany: Institutional background and
empirical evidence, Working paper, Humboldt-University Berlin.
Edwards, J. and K. Fischer, 1994, Banks, finance, and investment in Germany, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Nottmeier, H. and H. Schäfer, 1997, Praktische Fragen im Zusammenhang mit §§ 21,22
WpHG, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2, 87-96.
Payne, T. H., J. A. Millar, and G. W. Glezen, 1996, Fiduciary responsibility and bank-firm
relationships: An analysis of shareholder voting by banks, Journal of Corporate
Finance 3, 75-87.
Shleifer, A. und Robert Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance
52, 737-783.
Schneider, U., 1995, Mitteilungs- und Veröffentlichungspflichten bei Veränderungen des
Stimmrechtsanteils an börsennotierten Gesellschaften, in: H.-D. Assmann, U.
Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz: Kommentar, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG, Köln.
Wenger, E. und C. Kaserer, 1996, The German system of corporate governance in Germany -
A model which should not be imitated, Working Paper, Universität Würzburg.
Wenger, E., R. Hecker, and J. Knoesel, 1996, Abfindungsregeln und Minderheitenschutz bei
börsennotierten Kapitalgesellschaften, Working paper, University of Würzburg.23
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the size measures of firms listed in the official market of the Frankfurt stock exchange
The sample consists of all 430 firms reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell presents the mean, the median, and the number of observations.
Financial-statement data are based on the broadest available annual report in the sequence world report, mother report, group report, and individual-company report. Sales are
1/10 of total assets for banks, total premium receipts for insurance firms, and actual sales for other firms. Cash flow is defined as after-tax profit plus depreciation. Market value 1
(MV1) generally refers to ordinary shares, MV2 to preferred shares, and MV3 to registered shares. MV traded is the market value of equity registered for trading publicly, MV
total additionally includes non-listed shares, assuming they trade at the same price as listed shares. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms whose main purpose is to
fully own and operate (hold stakes in) independent companies.
Sample Sales Mn. DM Cash flow Mn.
DM
Employees MV1 traded
Mn. DM
MV2 traded
Mn. DM
MV3 traded
Mn. DM
MV traded Mn.
DM
MV total Mn.
DM
All firms (430) 4101
501
425
316
38
425
10348
1696
377
2133
278
414
1540
186
78
931
931
2
2348
303
428
2395
309
428
Banks (30) 11561
2921
29
234
55
29
7881
870
29
4203
1667
30 0 0
4203
1667
30
4203
1667
30
Insurance (26) 838
129
26
158
45
26
1892
1808
11
3765
885
25
6820
358
9
931
931
2
6053
1021
26
6255
1103
26
Industrial firms (374) 3745
440
370
334
34
370
10836
1731
337
1847
223
359
852
169
69 0
1940
242
372
1980
253
372
Sales above median
(501.608 Mn. DM)
8032
2075
213
602
119
213
18148
4575
202
4057
763
202
2282
320
51 0
4415
789
212
4484
856
212
Cash flow above
median (37.683 Mn.
DM)
7657
1678
212
625
127
213
18288
4440
196
4069
918
204
2381
374
49
931
931
2
4474
973
212
4557
1060
212
Number of employees
above median (1696)
7742
1643
188
608
102
189
20063
5186
189
3771
597
179
1128
244
48 0
3857
610
189
3934
710
189
Total market value
above median (302.75
Mn. DM)
7726
1722
213
605
111
214
19005
4423
191
4144
1037
208
2512
429
47
931
931
2
4589
1131
214
4671
1211
21424
Table 2: Number of direct stakes and voting blocks per firm
Direct stakes Voting blocks
Number of holdings Frequency Percent Cumulative
percentage
Frequency Percent Cumulative
percentage
0 7 1.6 1.6 7 1.6 1.6
1 206 47.9 49.5 249 57.9 59.5
2 97 22.6 72.1 88 20.5 80.0
3 47 10.9 83.0 38 8.8 88.8
4 40 9.3 92.3 35 8.1 97.0
5 16 3.7 96.0 5 1.2 98.1
6 8 1.9 97.9 6 1.4 99.5
7 4 0.9 98.8 1 0.2 99.8
8 2 0.5 99.3 1 0.2 100.0
9 0 0.0 99.3
10 1 0.2 99.5
11 1 0.2 99.8
12 0 0.0 99.8
13 1 0.2 100.0
Sum 430 100.0 430 100.025
Table 3. Empirical distribution of direct stakes and voting blocks for 430 officially listed corporations
For each of the 430 listed companies I compute the mean, minimum, maximum, median, interquartile range, standard deviation, and concentration measures of stakes in that
company. The table reports percentiles for these summary statistics. All columns except that for standard deviation are based on 430 observations. The standard-deviation statistics
are calculated from 217 and 174 observations for direct stakes and blocks, respectively. The Herfindahl index for the largest stake is simply the largest stake squared, while the
Herfindahl index for all holdings is based on the sum of all squared holdings (assuming that non-reporting shareholders hold negligible stakes).
A. Direct stakes Sum of direct
stakes
Mean direct
stake
Minimum direct
stake
Maximum direct
stake
Median direct
stake
Interquartile
range
Standard
deviation of
direct stakes
Herfindahl index
of largest
holding
Herfindahl index
of all holdings
Mean 69.88 47.58 41.18 55.28 46.78 12.31 16.66 0.39 0.42
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5% 11.13 7.50 1.21 10.00 6.17 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.01
10% 26.73 10.31 4.90 13.83 9.64 0.00 1.66 0.02 0.04
25% 54.82 18.54 8.72 26.00 15.83 0.00 5.65 0.07 0.14
50% 76.02 39.83 25.00 53.97 39.83 0.00 11.74 0.29 0.35
75% 91.75 77.31 77.31 81.43 77.31 17.10 24.69 0.66 0.66
90% 98.15 96.90 96.90 96.90 96.90 45.03 36.71 0.94 0.94
95% 99.02 98.83 98.83 98.83 98.83 55.57 47.50 0.98 0.98
99% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 73.91 53.78 1.00 1.00
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 81.20 57.42 1.00 1.00
B. Voting blocks Sum of voting
blocks
Mean voting
block
Minimum voting
block
Maximum
voting block
Median voting
block
Interquartile
range
Standard
deviation of
voting blocks
Herfindahl index
of largest
holding
Herfindahl index
of all holdings
Mean 70.16 53.01 48.02 58.89 52.41 9.86 16.60 0.44 0.46
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5% 11.93 9.47 5.40 10.60 8.19 0.00 0.50 0.01 0.01
10% 28.20 12.17 6.43 15.09 10.45 0.00 1.45 0.02 0.05
25% 54.03 22.52 10.05 29.60 20.00 0.00 4.29 0.09 0.16
50% 76.53 49.10 45.92 62.36 49.10 0.00 10.88 0.39 0.42
75% 92.10 85.10 85.10 86.06 85.10 11.79 26.20 0.74 0.74
90% 98.18 97.24 97.24 97.24 97.24 44.06 38.85 0.95 0.95
95% 99.02 98.84 98.84 98.84 98.84 51.92 47.43 0.98 0.98
99% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 71.23 53.78 1.00 1.00
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 80.15 56.67 1.00 1.0026
Table 4: The sum of stakes, the largest stake, and the number of stakes controlled in individual firms
The sample consists of all 430 firms reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell presents statistics on the sum of stakes per firm, the largest stake per
firm, and the number of stakes per firm. Financial-statement data are based on the broadest available annual report in the sequence world report, mother report, group report, and
individual-company report. Sales are 1/10 of total assets for banks, total premium receipts for insurance firms, and actual sales for other firms. Cash flow is defined as profit after
taxes plus depreciation. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms whose main purpose is to fully own and operate
(hold stakes in) independent companies.
Sample
(number of firms)
Mean
(direct stake)
Median
(direct stake)
Minimum
(direct stake)
Maximum
(direct stake)
Mean
(voting block)
Median
(voting block)
Minimum
(voting block)
Maximum
(voting block)
All firms (430) 69.88
55.28
2.11
76.02
53.97
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
13.00
70.16
58.89
1.76
76.53
62.36
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
8.00
Banks (30) 68.71
55.56
2.03
83.61
59.70
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
97.50
97.50
5.00
69.01
57.98
1.83
83.61
67.05
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
97.50
97.50
4.00
Insurance (26) 76.73
57.47
2.50
75.65
52.10
2.00
5.00
5.00
1.00
99.32
99.32
7.00
76.98
65.35
2.00
76.40
75.11
1.00
5.00
5.00
1.00
99.32
99.32
5.00
Industrial firms (374) 69.50
55.10
2.09
75.92
80.53
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
13.00
69.78
58.52
1.73
76.21
61.40
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
8.00
Total market value above
median (309.0 Mn. DM)
(214)
67.18
49.85
2.35
75.00
50.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
13.00
67.63
54.83
1.89
75.01
53.99
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
8.0027
Table 5. Number of stakes and voting blocks per shareholder
Holders of direct stakes Holders of voting blocks
Number of holdings Frequency Percent Cumulative
percentage
Frequency Percent Cumulative
percentage
1 627 88.7 88.7 437 85.0 85.0
2 46 6.5 95.2 41 8.0 93.0
3 14 2.1 97.2 11 2.1 95.1
4 10 1.4 98.6 6 1.2 96.3
5 1 0.1 98.7 8 1.6 97.9
6 2 0.3 99.0 3 0.6 98.4
7 1 0.1 99.2
8 1 0.1 99.3 1 0.2 98.6
9 1 0.1 99.4 1 0.2 98.8
10 1 0.2 99.0
11 1 0.1 99.6
12 1 0.1 99.7
14 3 0.6 99.6
18 1 0.1 99.9
24 1 0.1 100.00
25 1 0.2 99.8
27 1 0.2 100.0
Sum 707 100.0 514 100.028
Table 6: Percentage share held by different shareholder types in all 430 listed firms
Type of stakeholder (number of different
entities)
Number of
direct stakes
Number of
voting blocks
% of all
officially listed
equity held as
direct stakes
% all officially
listed equity
controlled via
voting blocks
Average size of
direct stake (%)
held by the
specific type
Average size of
voting block (%)
held by the
specific type
All shareholders (835) 907 755 69.88 70.16 n/a n/a
Foreign (2) 3 3 0.13 0.13 18.90 18.90
Banks (43) 109 116 7.14 7.82 28.16 28.98
Industrial firm (248) 234 186 28.71 26.48 52.76 61.23
Family or worker pools (27) 24 21 1.69 2.21 30.33 45.18
Government (22) 19 23 1.41 2.35 31.96 43.90
Holdings (88) 81 59 7.74 7.00 41.11 51.04
Investment firms (85) 75 41 6.65 3.79 38.10 39.75
Church (1) 1 0 0.02 0.00 7.98 0.00
Bank-controlled investment firms
i (9) 13 11 0.70 0.78 23.08 30.64
Individuals (252) 254 207 10.26 13.07 17.37 27.16
Foundations (13) 16 17 1.23 1.95 33.12 49.24
Insurance (45) 78 71 4.20 4.58 23.14 27.72
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.29
Table 7: Percentage share held by different shareholder types in 374 industrial firms
Type of stakeholder (number of different
entities)
Number of
direct stakes
Number of
voting blocks
% of all firms
held as direct
stakes
% all firms
controlled via
voting blocks
Average size of
direct stake (%)
held by the
specific type
Average size of
voting block (%)
held by the
specific type
All shareholders 781 648 69.50 69.78 n/a n/a
Foreign 3 3 0.15 0.15 18.90 18.90
Banks 69 77 3.98 4.90 21.55 23.79
Industrial firm 227 180 32.33 29.63 53.27 61.56
Family or worker pools 24 21 1.95 2.54 30.33 45.18
Government 15 18 1.31 2.18 32.62 45.26
Holdings 64 53 7.45 7.50 43.54 52.94
Investment firms 68 36 7.24 3.85 39.83 40.03
Church 1 0 0.02 7.98
Bank-controlled investment firms
i 5 5 0.26 0.24 19.68 18.06
Individuals 252 205 11.74 14.76 17.42 26.93
Foundations 15 16 1.39 2.21 34.58 51.62
Insurance 38 34 1.68 1.82 16.57 20.06
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.30
Table 8: Percentage share held by different shareholder types in 30 banks
Type of stakeholder (number of different
entities)
Number of
direct stakes
Number of
voting blocks
% of all firms
held as direct
stakes
% all firms
controlled via
voting blocks
Average size of
direct stake (%)
held by the
specific type
Average size of
voting block (%)
held by the
specific type
All shareholders 61 55 68.71 69.01 n/a n/a
Foreign
Banks 28 27 49.13 46.90 52.64 52.11
Industrial firm 2 2 1.08 1.08 16.23 16.23
Family or worker pools
Government 3 4 3.10 5.67 30.97 42.50
Holdings 8 3 6.80 3.08 25.51 30.75
Investment firms 2 2 1.18 1.18 17.65 17.65
Church
Bank-controlled investment firms
i 5 3 3.45 3.02 20.73 30.19
Individuals 1 1 0.40 3.02 11.95 90.69
Foundations 1 1 0.37 0.37 11.23 11.23
Insurance 11 12 3.19 4.69 8.70 11.73
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.31
Table 9: Percentage share held by different shareholder types in 26 insurance companies
Type of stakeholder (number of different
entities)
Number of
direct stakes
Number of
voting blocks
% of all firms
held as direct
stakes
% all firms
controlled via
voting blocks
Average size of
direct stake
(%)held by the
specific type
Average size of
voting block (%)
held by the
specific type
All shareholders 65 52 76.73 76.98 n/a n/a
Foreign
Banks 12 12 4.18 4.71 9.05 10.23
Industrial firm 5 4 8.53 10.62 44.37 69.00
Family or worker pools
Government 1 1 0.96 0.96 25.00 25.00
Holdings 9 3 13.03 4.35 37.63 37.69
Investment firms 5 3 4.37 5.90 22.70 51.10
Church
Bank-controlled investment firms
i 3 3 3.77 6.01 32.65 52.05
Individuals 1 1 0.39 0.39 10.00 10.00
Foundations
Insurance 29 25 41.51 44.06 37.22 45.82
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.32
Table 10: The magnitude of size-weighted stakes held by different shareholder types
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell contains the mean, the median, and the number of
observations (number of different shareholders) for each variable. Directly controlled refers to the sum of all direct stakes, controlled refers to the sum of all voting blocks held
by the individual stakeholders. Financial-statement data are based on the broadest available annual report in the sequence world report, mother report, group report, and
individual-company report. Sales are 1/10 of total assets for banks, total premium receipts for insurance firms, and actual sales for other firms. Cash flow is defined as profit after
taxes plus depreciation. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms whose main purpose is to fully own and operate
(hold stakes in) independent companies.
Sample (number of reporting
shareholders, number of direct
stakes, number of blocks)
Sales directly
controlled
in Mn. DM
Cash flow
directly
controlled in
Mn. DM
Employees
directly
controlled
Total MV
directly
controlled in
Mn. DM
Sales controlled
in Mn. DM
Cash flow
controlled in
Mn. DM
Employees
controlled
Total MV
controlled in
Mn. DM
All shareholders (835, 907, 755) 1031
125
700
86
9
701
2777
410
640
681
88
703
1437
146
510
120
11
509
3923
547
460
950
93
510
Foreign (2, 3, 3) 11263
11263
2
369
369
2
31105
31105
2
3895
3895
2
11263
11263
2
369
369
2
31105
31105
2
3895
3895
2
Banks (44, 109, 116) 3290
225
35
139
10
35
6482
246
33
2280
121
35
4306
333
30
192
27
30
8581
908
28
2795
330
30
Industrial firm (248, 233, 185) 786
184
185
53
12
184
2781
694
171
465
114
186
1217
239
133
84
17
132
4248
877
122
731
135
133
Family or worker pools (28, 25, 22) 788
63
24
67
8
24
2192
428
22
443
70
24
1262
87
21
99
14
21
4387
1158
19
644
110
21
Government (22, 19, 23) 6247
1355
16
1238
161
16
17026
2315
15
4637
608
16
6495
2316
19
1209
185
19
17645
2816
18
4339
639
19
Holdings (88, 81, 59) 1688
343
76
110
30
76
3982
934
64
877
277
76
1846
423
48
105
43
48
4030
1208
41
917
329
48
Investment firms (85, 75, 41) 955
242
67
88
18
69
2910
948
57
510
184
69
545
232
38
46
15
38
1721
833
30
431
133
38
Church (1, 1, 0) 0
0
1
3
3
1
597
597
1
12
12
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
033
Sample (number of reporting
shareholders, number of direct
stakes, number of blocks)
Sales directly
controlled
in Mn. DM
Cash flow
directly
controlled in
Mn. DM
Employees
directly
controlled
Total MV
directly
controlled in
Mn. DM
Sales controlled
in Mn. DM
Cash flow
controlled in
Mn. DM
Employees
controlled
Total MV
controlled in
Mn. DM
Bank-controlled investment firms
i
(9, 13, 11)
2677
1767
9
104
56
9
4596
2531
9
986
684
9
2235
864
6
113
18
6
3969
629
6
1021
685
6
Individuals (252, 254, 207) 216
38
234
17
3
234
617
144
222
155
19
234
316
46
179
26
4
179
948
247
166
247
33
179
Foundations (13, 16, 17) 2057
413
13
131
53
13
6057
767
13
1016
376
13
2479
652
11
151
63
11
7573
1630
11
761
376
11
Insurance (45, 78, 71) 681
122
38
65
46
38
1390
240
31
1574
73
38
2736
117
23
201
11
23
5972
235
17
3499
164
23
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.34
Table 11: Size-weighted stakes held by different shareholder types as a percentage of all listed corporations
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Directly controlled refers to the sum of all direct stakes,
controlled refers to the sum of all voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Financial-statement data are based on the broadest available annual report in the sequence
world report, mother report, group report, and individual-company report. Sales are 1/10 of total assets for banks, total premium receipts for insurance firms, and actual sales for
other firms. Cash flow is defined as profit after taxes plus depreciation. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms
whose main purpose is to fully own and operate (hold stakes in) independent companies.
Type of shareholder Sales of
officially listed
firms directly
controlled in %
Cash flow of
officially listed
firms directly
controlled in %
Employees of
officially listed
firms directly
controlled in %
Total MV of
officially listed
firms directly
controlled in %
Sales of
officially listed
firms
controlled via
voting blocks
in %
Cash flow of
officially listed
firms
controlled via
voting blocks
in %
Employees of
officially listed
firms
controlled via
voting blocks
in %
Total MV of
officially listed
firms
controlled via
voting blocks
in %
All shareholders 41.4 44.9 45.6 46.7 42.1 45.5 46.3 47.3
Foreign 1.3 0.5 1.6 0.8 1.3 0.5 1.6 0.8
Banks 6.6 3.6 5.5 7.8 7.4 4.3 6.2 8.2
Industrial firm 8.3 7.3 12.2 8.4 9.3 8.3 13.3 9.5
Family or worker pools 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.3
Government 5.7 14.7 6.5 7.2 7.1 17.1 8.1 8.0
Holdings 7.4 6.2 6.5 6.5 5.1 3.8 4.2 4.3
Investment firms 3.7 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6
Church 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bank-controlled investment firm
i 1.4 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6
Individuals 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.3
Foundations 1.5 1.3 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 2.1 0.8
Insurance 1.5 1.8 1.1 5.8 3.6 3.4 2.6 7.9
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.35
Table 12: Total market value controlled by different shareholders in listed corporations
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell contains the sum of total market value in million
DM controlled by holding direct stakes, and below the sum of market value controlled via voting blocks. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of shareholders for the
particular cell. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms whose main purpose is to fully own and operate (hold stakes
in) independent companies.
Type of shareholder Type of controlled company
Bank Insurance company Industrial company Total
All shareholders 38303 (49)
39972 (37)
105439 (43)
105539 (30)
335118 (640)
338966 (477)
478860 (732)
484477 (544)
Foreign 0
0
0
0
7790 (2)
7790 (2)
7790 (2)
7790 (2)
Banks 16255 (18)
15720 (16)
40436 (6)
41339 (6)
23093 (27)
26789 (25)
79785 (51)
83848 (47)
Industrial firm 1086 (2)
1086 (2)
1092 (5)
2817 (4)
84408 (181)
93510 (129)
86453 (188)
97280 (135)
Family or worker pools 0
0
0
0
10509 (24)
13381 (21)
10643 (24)
13515 (21)
Government 3705 (3)
4962 (3)
457 (1)
457 (1)
70035 (14)
77025 (17)
74197 (18)
82445 (21)
Holdings 8164 (8)
4604 (3)
11671 (9)
8491 (3)
46818 (59)
30918 (42)
66654 (76)
44013 (48)
Investment firms 993 (2)
493 (2)
3263 (5)
1399 (3)
30943 (62)
14495 (33)
35198 (69)
16386 (38)
Church 0
0
0
0
12 (1)
0
12 (1)
0
Bank-controlled investment firms
i
4336 (5)
1841 (3)
449 (1)
687 (1)
4088 (4)
3601 (4)
8872 (10)
6129 (8)
Individuals 32 (1)
245 (1)
213 (1)
213 (1)
35978 (232)
43762 (179)
36223 (237)
ii
44220 (184)
Foundations 272 (1)
272 (1)
0
0
12938 (12)
8099 (10)
13210 (13)
8370 (11)
Insurance 3461 (9)
10750 (6)
47858 (15)
50137 (11)
8506 (21)
19596 (13)
59824 (45)
80482 (30)
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.36
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
ii Three stakes and blocks are held in firms where no market value is available.37
Table 13: Relative power of different shareholders in listed corporations
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell contains the mean and the median in parentheses.
To compute mean and median ranks for each shareholder, all stakes (blocks) for each company are ranked by size and the mean rank is recorded for each shareholder. The
number of stakes and the concentration measures are computed analogously. The Herfindahl index represents the sum of all squared stakes (blocks) of each company. The table
reports the grand mean and median over all shareholders.
Sample Number
of direct
sharehol
ders
Mean rank
of direct
stake
Mean
number of
direct
stakes per
target firm
Mean
Herfindahl
index of direct
stakes
Number
of holders
of voting
blocks
Mean
rank of
voting
block
Mean
number of
voting
blocks per
target firm
Mean
Herfindahl
index of voting
blocks
All shareholders 707 2.26 3.5 0.31 (0.24) 514 1.82 2.7 0.36 (0.30)
Foreign 2 1.75 3.0 0.20 (0.20) 2 1.75 3.0 0.20 (0.20)
Banks 35 2.20 2.9 0.33 (0.30) 30 1.95 2.6 0.35 (0.30)
Industrial firm 187 1.54 2.2 0.47 (0.42) 134 1.34 1.8 0.54 (0.56)
Family or worker pools 24 2.10 3.4 0.25 (0.19) 21 1.52 2.0 0.36 (0.38)
Government 16 1.84 3.1 0.29 (0.31) 19 1.53 2.3 0.36 (0.31)
Holdings 76 1.64 2.5 0.33 (0.23) 48 1.54 2.2 0.39 (0.31)
Investment firms 69 1.70 3.0 0.32 (0.20) 38 1.47 2.4 0.32 (0.25)
Church 1 4.00 7.0 0.27 (0.27) 0
Bank-controlled investment firms
i
9 1.86 2.9 0.17 (0.16) 6 2.00 2.7 0.20 (0.18)
Individuals 237 3.26 5.1 0.18 (0.13) 182 2.33 3.5 0.24 (0.17)
Foundations 13 2.05 4.7 0.26 (0.33) 11 1.82 3.3 0.32 (0.33)
Insurance 38 2.28 3.0 0.31 (0.26) 23 2.07 2.6 0.38 (0.30)
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.38
Table 14: Stakes and voting blocks held by the ten shareholders controlling the greatest
market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September
1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable. Directly controlled refers to direct stakes,
controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all
equity. Data on blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders
(number of
direct stakes,
voting blocks
included in
calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms
exceeding DM 300 million market
value, sorted by decreasing market
value)
Blockholders Market
value of
direct
stakes in
Mn. DM
Market
value of
controlled
voting
blocks in
Mn. DM
Voting
blocks as %
of the
market value
of all 430
listed
corporations
Bundesanstalt
für Post und
Telekommuni
kation (1, 1)
Deutsche Telekom None, government 40541
40541
49431
49431
4.82
Allianz (18,
25)
Münchner Rück, VEBA, Dresdner
Bank, BASF, Bayr. Hypo, RWE, BDF
Beiersdorf, Bayer, Deutsche Bank,
Linde, Schering, BHF-Bank,
Lahmeyer, Rheinelektra, AMB
Münchner Rück
26%, Bayer.
Vereinsbank 10%,
Deutsche Bank 10%,
Dresdner Bank 10%,
Bayer. Hypobank
5%
22720
1262
45820
1833
4.47
Deutsche
Bank (24, 27)
Daimler Benz, Allianz, Münchner
Rück, Frankfurter Hypo, Südzucker,
Linde, Bayerische Vereinsbank,
Metallgesellschaft, Heidelberger
Zement, Karstadt, Ph. Holzmann,
AMB
Allianz 5% 31288
1304
31688
1174
3.09
Münchner
Rück (12, 14)
Allianz, Bayerische Hypo, Victoria,
AMB, Hermes Kreditversicherung
Allianz 25%, Bayer.
Vereinsbank 10%,
Deutsche Bank 10%,
Dresdner Bank 10%,
DIA VV 6%
21608
1801
22085
1578
2.15
Dresdner Bank
(11, 14)
Allianz, Münchner Rück, Deutsche
Hypo, OLB, Heidelberger Zement,
AMB, Hamburghyp, Bilfinger &
Berger, Metallgesellschaft
Allianz 22%, Nona
VV 10%, Vermo VV
11%
18027
1639
19595
1400
1.91
Bayerische
Vereinsbank
(9, 9)
Allianz, Münchner Rück, Vereins-
und Westbank, BHB, Nürnberger
Hypo, Süddeutsche Bodencreditbank
Viag 7%,
Bayernwerk 7%,
Deutsche Bank 5%
14839
1649
14839
1649
1.45
Dietmar Hopp
(1, 1)
SAP none 647
647
13387
13387
1.31
RWE (4, 10) RWE-DEA, Rheinelektra, Lahmeyer,
LEW, Ph. Holzmann, MKW, Rhenag
RW Holding 12%,
City of Essen 8%,
Allianz 8%
8817
2204
11598
1160
1.13
VIAG (2, 14) Contigas, OBAG, SKW Trostberg,
Bayerische Vereinsbank, EVO, VEW,
BEWAG, Schmalbach-Lubeca,
Grosskraftwerk Franken,
Gerresheimer Glas, ÜWU
State of Bavaria
25%, VI
Industriebet. 11%,
HI VV 10% (VI and
HI are majority
controlled by Viag
itself)
1527
764
10207
729
1.00
Kuwait Petro
(0, 1)
Hoechst unknown 0
0
8204
8204
0.08
Sum (82, 116) 160014 226853 22.1339
Table 15: Minimum ownership relations between the top five private shareholders
The table contains ultimate cross-ownership among the top five shareholders in officially listed German corporations. The voting blocks come from BAWe filings and are
supplemented by information from Hoppenstedt’s Konzernstruktur Datenbank. True control exceeds the figures reported in the table, because only direct stakes held by firms that
are majority-controlled by the top five are considered. Several additional links exist among the five through firms in which they hold only minority stakes.
i
Target Shareholder
Allianz Deutsche
Bank
Münchner
Rück
Dresdner
Bank
Bayerische
Vereinsbank
Other firms
controlled by
the top five
Stakes
controlled by
the other four
Allianz 10.00% 25.00% 10.00% 10% 5.00%
ii 60.00%
Deutsche Bank 5.03% 1.50% 6.53%
Münchner Rück 25.00% 9.90% 9.90% 9.90% 5.00%
iii 59.70%
Dresdner Bank 10.18% 10.00%
iv 2.30% 31.36%
v 53.84%
Bayerische Vereinsbank 5.21% 5.40% 10.61%
                                               
i For example, VIAG owns a 7.2% stake in Bayerische Vereinsbank. Major stakes in VIAG include 5.9%. Another example is VERMO Vermögensverwaltung, in which RWE and
Bayer own minority stakes, and Allianz and Münchner Rück in turn own minority stakes in Bayer and RWE, respectively. These minority links are not included in the figures
presented in the table.
ii Held by Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, in which 40% are held by Bayerische Vereinsbank, 5.8% by Münchner Rück, 10.22% by Allianz, and 10.93% by Quinta
iii Held by Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, in which 40% are held by Bayerische Vereinsbank, 5.8% by Münchner Rück, 10.22% by Allianz, and 10.93% by Quinta
iv Held via Deutscher Herold, an insurance subsidiary of Deutsche Bank.
v 10.6% held by FGF and 10.58% by Vermo Vermögensverwaltung, two holdings controlled jointly by the top five. The remaining 10.18% are held by Nona
Vermögensverwaltung, which is controlled by Allianz and Münchner Rück.40
Table 16: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five banks controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of direct
stakes, voting blocks included in
calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding DM 300 million
market value, sorted by decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Deutsche Bank (24, 27) Daimler Benz, Allianz, Münchner Rück, Frankfurter Hypo,
Südzucker, Linde, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Metallgesellschaft,
Heidelberger Zement, Karstadt, Ph. Holzmann, AMB
Allianz 5% 31288 31688 3.09
Dresdner Bank (11, 14) Allianz, Münchner Rück, Deutsche Hypo, OLB, Heidelberger
Zement, AMB, Hamburghyp, Bilfinger & Berger,
Metallgesellschaft
Allianz 22%, Nona VV
10%, Vermo VV 11%
18027 19595 1.91
Bayerische Vereinsbank (9, 9) Allianz, Münchner Rück, Vereins- und Westbank, BHB,
Nürnberger Hypo, Süddeutsche Bodencreditbank
Viag 7%, Bayernwerk
7%, Deutsche Bank 5%
14839 14839 1.44
Commerzbank (8, 8) Rheinhyp, Linde, Karstadt none 3975 3975 0.39
Bayerische Hypo (6, 6) Allianz, Württemberger Hypo Allianz 23%, Münchner
Rück 6%,
3905 3905 0.38
Sum (58, 64) 72033 74001 7.2241
Table 17: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five industrial firms controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of
direct stakes, voting
blocks included in
calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding DM 300 million
market value, sorted by decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
RWE (4, 10) RWE-DEA, Rheinelektra, Lahmeyer, LEW, Ph.
Holzmann, MKW, Rhenag
RW Holding 12%, City of Essen 8%,
Allianz 8%
8817 11598 1.13
VIAG (2, 14) Contigas, OBAG, SKW Trostberg, Bayerische
Vereinsbank, EVO, VEW, BEWAG, Schmalbach-
Lubeca, Grosskraftwerk Franken, Gerresheimer Glas,
ÜWU
State of Bavaria 25%, VI Industriebet.
11%, HI VV 10% (VI and HI are
majority controlled by Viag itself)
1527 10207 1.00
Kuwait Petroleum (0, 1) Hoechst unknown 0 8204 0.80
Ford Motor Co (1, 1) Ford-Werke unknown 6111 6111 0.60
Stora AB (0, 1) FPB Holding unknown 0 4478 0.44
Sum (7, 27) 16456 40598 3.9642
Table 18: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five family or worker pools controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of direct stakes, voting
blocks included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding
DM 300 million market value, sorted by
decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Aktienbindungsvertrag Henkel, 48 members (1, 1) Henkel none 4948 4948 0.48
Südd. Zuckerrübenverw. Cooperative (1, 1) none 3275 3275 0.32
Merck Family (0, 1) Merck none 2620 0.26
Porsche Voting Pool (0, 1) Porsche none 987 0.10
Association of family shareholder Dyckerhoff, 295
members (1, 1)
Dyckerhoff none 432 553 0.05
Sum (3, 5) 8655 12382 1.2143
Table 19: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five government agencies controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of direct stakes, voting blocks
included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding DM
300 million market value, sorted by
decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Bundesanstalt für Post und Telekommunikation (1, 1) Deutsche Telekom none 40541 49431 4.82
State of Berlin (2, 3) Bankgesellschaft Berlin, BEWAG, bhh none 5739 6997 0.68
Kommunal Energie-Beteiligungsges. mbH (1, 1) VEW none 4698 4698 0.46
State of Lower Saxony (1, 1) Volkswagen none 14 3909 0.38
State of Bavaria (1, 1) VIAG none 3754 3754 0.37
Sum (6, 7) 54746 68788 6.7144
Table 20: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five holdings controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of
direct stakes, voting blocks
included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms
exceeding DM 300 million market
value, sorted by decreasing market
value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Vereinte Holding AG (1, 1) Vereinte Versicherung Allianz 100% 4493 4493 0.44
RW Holding AG (1, 1) RWE Municipalities 32%, Rest unknown 3829 3829 0.37
DIA Verm. Verw. (1, 1) Münchner Rück unknown 3682 3682 0.36
Metro Holding AG (0, 5) Praktiker, Horten, Massa, Kaufhalle Three families (Schmidt-Ruthenbeck, Beisheim
Stiftung, Haniel) 33.3% each
0 3290 0.32
Siemens-Verm. Verw. (1, 1) Siemens unknown 3032 3032 0.30
Sum (4, 9) 15036 18326 1.7945
Table 21: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five investment firms controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of direct stakes,
voting blocks included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding
DM 300 million market value, sorted by
decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
H. O. F. Bet. GmbH (1, 1) Fresenius Dresdner Bank 50%, E. Kröner Stiftung
50%
2477 2477 0.24
VI-Industrie Bet. GmbH (1, 1) VIAG Viag 50%, Rest unknown 1559 1559 0.15
Eugenia Trust (1, 1) SAP unknown 1192 1192 0.12
Schwenk Bet. GmbH & Co KG (1, 1) Heidelberger Zement unknown 1181 1181 0.12
Grohe Ind. Bet. GmbH & Co KG (1, 1) Grohe, Fr. unknown 1041 1041 0.10
Sum (5, 5) 7450 7450 0.7346
Table 22: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five bank-controlled investment firms controlling the greatest market value
i
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of
direct stakes, voting blocks
included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms
exceeding DM 300 million market
value, sorted by decreasing market
value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
FGC mbH (1, 1) Hoechst Dresdner Bank 20%, Gerling 10%, Münchn. Rück
30%
3415 3415 0.33
Württembergische AG Vers.
Bet. (4, 5)
Baden-Württ. Bank, Württ.
Lebensversicherung
Schw. Rück 32%, Baden-Württ. Bank 15%, Ehlerding
family 10%, State 10%, Bosch family 10%
684 1222 0.12
DEPFA Holding (1, 1) Depfa AG Several banks jointly 100% 893 893 0.09
Rhein-Neckar Bankbet. (1,
1)
Baden-Württ. Bank Deutsche Bank 49%, Bosch family 29%, Münchner
Rück 12%, Wüstenrot Stiftung 10%
478 478 0.05
(no more with blocks over
DM 300 million in market
value)
Sum (9, 10) 5537 6075 0.59
                                               
i Includes investment firms that are primarily controlled by banks and insurance companies. This subsample is only a subset of bank-controlled investment firms, because
ownership and control data are only available for some of the mostly unlisted holdings and investment firms.47
Table 23: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five individuals controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of
direct stakes, voting blocks
included in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding DM 300 million
market value, sorted by decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Hopp, D. (1, 1) SAP none 647 13387 1.31
Klatten, S. (2, 2) Altana, BMW none 4627 4327 0.45
Quandt, J. (1, 1) BMW none 3069 3069 0.30
Quandt, S. (1, 2) BMW none 2915 2966 0.29
Schwarz-Schütte, P. (1, 1) Schwarz Pharma none 459 2018 0.20
Sum (6, 7) 11717 26067 2.5448
Table 24: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five foundations controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to direct stakes, controlled refers voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Market value refers to the market value of all equity. Data on
blockholders come from BAWe (1996) and is supplemented by data from KSD.
Shareholders (number of direct stakes, voting blocks included
in calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding
DM 300 million market value, sorted by
decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
A. Krupp Stiftung (1, 1) Krupp unknown 2579 2579 0.25
Bayer. Braustiftung J. Schörghuber & Co. Holding KG (2, 4) Paulaner-Salvator, Hacker-Pschorr unknown 1115 1424 0.14
Hertie Stiftung (1, 1) Karstadt unknown 1363 1363 0.13
F. Thyssen Stiftung (1, 1) Thyssen unknown 728 728 0.07
Schickedanz Holding-Stiftung & Co. KG (3, 4) (none greater DM 150 million) unknown 130 504 0.05
Sum (8, 11) 5916 6599 0.6449
Table 25: Stakes and voting blocks held by the five insurance firms controlling the greatest market value
The sample consists of all 430 firms and 835 shareholders reporting voting control to the BAWe by September 1996. Each cell reports the sum and the mean of each variable.
Directly controlled refers to the sum of all direct stakes, controlled refers to the sum of all voting blocks held by the individual stakeholders. Financial-statement data are based on
the broadest available annual report in the sequence world report, mother report, group report, and individual-company report. Sales are 1/10 of total assets for banks, total
premium receipts for insurance firms, and actual sales for other firms. Cash flow is defined as profit after taxes plus depreciation. Market value refers to the market value of all
equity. Holdings (investment firms) are defined as firms whose main purpose is to fully own and operate (hold stakes in) independent companies.
Shareholders (number of
direct stakes, voting
blocks included in
calculations)
Main targets controlled
(voting blocks in listed firms exceeding DM 300 million market value,
sorted by decreasing market value)
Blockholders Market value
of direct
stakes in Mn.
DM
Market value
of controlled
voting blocks
in Mn. DM
Voting blocks
as % of the
market value of
all 430 listed
corporations
Allianz (18, 25) Münchner Rück, VEBA, Dresdner Bank, BASF, Bayr. Hypo, RWE,
BDF Beiersdorf, Bayer, Deutsche Bank, Linde, Schering, BHF-Bank,
Lahmeyer, Rheinelektra, AMB
Münchner Rück 26%,
Bayer. Vereinsbank
10%, Deutsche Bank
10%, Dresdner Bank
10%, Bayer. Hypobank
5%
22720 45820 4.47
Münchner Rück (12, 14) Allianz, Bayerische Hypo, Victoria, AMB, Hermes
Kreditversicherung
Allianz 25%, Bayer.
Vereinsbank 10%,
Deutsche Bank 10%,
Dresdner Bank 10%,
DIA VV 6%
21608 22085 2.15
AMB (5, 6) Volksfürsorge, Thuringia Versicherung, AM Leben, AM Vers, AGF 27%, Dresdner
Bank 15%, Münchner
Rück 9%, Deutsche
Bank 5%, Allianz 5%
3044 4824 0 47
CKAG (1, 1) Nordstern Allg. Vers. Compagnie UAP 75% 1865 1865 0 18
General Re (0, 1) Köln. Rück U.S. Health and Life
Insurance Co. 66%, Rest
unknown
0 1608 0 16
Sum (36, 46) 49236 76202 7 4350
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the largest voting block for all firms
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the largest direct stake for all firms
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